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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

AFTER MANAGED CARE: GRAY BOXES, TIERS AND
CONSUMERISM

JOHN V. JACOBI*
America is at a troubling stage in the discussion of health care finance. A
decade ago, discussions of the fair and efficient allocation of health care
services involved the articulation and review of grand architectonic plans.
Originating from various political and social perspectives, these plans
proposed to organize and rationalize the financing of the health care delivery
system.1 Following the collapse of broad systemic reform in 1994, we entered
a period when health finance developed in a piecemeal fashion, with care for
the poor focusing on Medicaid expansions often tied to innovative statespecific reforms,2 and care for the non-poor committed to commercial
managed care plans.3
Managed care was the focus of health finance reform in this period for
public and private programs, for the poor and non-poor alike. The social
problems of access and cost containment were committed to the business plan
of commercial managed care organizations. For a number of years, the
strategy seemed to work. We were not quite sure why it worked; we knew that
America had rejected a governmental solution to the twin problems of
uninsurance and cost inflation, and had instead entrusted the problems to
markets and commercial managers. The result during the mid- to late-1990s

* Professor and Associate Director, Seton Hall Law School Health Law & Policy Program.
Thanks for the research assistance of Maria Draucikas and Dawn Woodruff.
1. See, e.g., Karen Davis & Cathy Schoen, Universal Coverage: Building on Medicare and
Employer Financing, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1994, at 7; Mark V. Pauly, Making a Case for
Employer-Enforced Individual Mandates, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1994, at 21; Paul Starr & Walter
A. Zelman, A Bridge to Compromise: Competition Under a Budget, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993,
at 7; Alain C. Enthoven & Richard Kronick, Universal Health Insurance Through Incentives
Reform, 265 JAMA 2532 (1991); John Holahan et al., An American Approach to Health System
Reform, 265 JAMA 2537 (1991). The paradigm of the architectonic plan, of course, was the
“Clinton Health Plan,” the legislation introduced after much deliberation and turmoil as the
Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993). See WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY
COUNCIL, THE PRESIDENT’S HEALTH SECURITY PLAN: THE CLINTON BLUEPRINT (1993).
2. See Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7
(2001); MICHAEL S. SPARER, MEDICAID AND THE LIMITS OF STATE HEALTH REFORM (1996).
3. See Sallyanne Payton, Managed Care—The First Chapter Comes to a Close, 32 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 573, 576 (1999).
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was the seeming defeat of health care cost inflation and a slowing, perhaps
even a reversal, of the trend toward higher rates of uninsurance.4
Managed care, as it turns out, did not solve our problems. Health care cost
inflation is back.5 Uninsurance—a problem too often ignored in the boom
years of economic expansion—is on the rise. Simultaneously, research
sampling has revealed that tens of thousands of patients may die each year as a
result of medical errors.6 Cost, quality and access—the subject of systemic
reform proposals a decade ago—are more often analyzed today as problems of
managed care.
Murder . . . or Just a Misunderstanding?
Peter Jacobson has wryly and accurately commented on the “thousand
cuts” suffered by managed care in the last decade.7 Many participants objected
to central features of managed care. Patients, of course, objected to restrictions
in access to providers of their choice and to plans declining coverage after
second-guessing treating physicians’ judgment. Physicians also objected to
managed care, arguing that “medical policy must derive solely from the
physician community.”8 However, these objections remained even when
managed care decisions were being made by physicians. The real goal seemed
to be to preserve the prerogatives of each individual treating physician from
any impingement. State legislatures seemed responsive to patients’ objections
to managed care,9 even while states in the 1990s moved their own programs—
principally Medicaid—squarely into the managed care camp.
Managed care has endured a near-death experience and is emerging
chastened. It will no longer be advanced as “all things to all people” or the
deus ex machina savior of health finance. However, it may be fruitful to
conceive of the troubles of managed care not just as the result of wounds
4. See Paul B. Ginsburg & Jon R. Gabel, Tracking Health Care Costs: What’s New in
1998?, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 141, 144.
5. See Jon Gabel et al., Job-Based Health Benefits in 2002: Some Important Trends,
HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 143, 144-45; Drew E. Altman & Larry Levitt, Web Exclusive,
The Sad History of Health Care Cost Containment as Told in One Chart, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 23,
2002, at W83, at http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/2101Altman.pdf.
6. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Why is There a Quality Chasm?, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug.
2002, at 13; COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(2001), available at http://www.iom.edu/iom/iomhome/nsf/pages/2001+reports (last visited Jan.
6, 2003); COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO
ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000)
[hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN].
7. Peter D. Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy Whodunit, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
365, 394 (2003).
8. Id. at 371.
9. Id. at 382.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

AFTER MANAGED CARE

399

inflicted by adversaries, or even as self-inflicted wounds of managers lacking
in vision (although Professor Jacobson demonstrates that such wounds played
their part in the drama). Some have argued with persuasive force that managed
care, like the hero of a Greek tragedy, grew in the 1980s and 1990s with the
seeds of its destruction inborn.
Americans are conflicted on the wisdom of entrusting to government the
solution of social problems.10 Although we flirt with comprehensive
government control of our health care system, we settle for a mixed system
with some regulation of a system dominated by the private market. The
Clinton administration made reform proposals that were perceived—fairly or
unfairly—as injecting government into previously private relationships,
thereby diminishing consumer autonomy.11 When the dust cleared, managed
care had stepped into the breach, offering a solution to increasing costs (and
perhaps by implication increasing uninsurance) through nongovernmental
means. There was some overselling on the part of managed care and no small
measure of both credulity and wishful thinking on our part. Managed care
sought to use market mechanisms to control and channel health finances with
an eye toward proper, efficient distribution of funding. Some aspects of the
health finance market were acknowledged to be flawed with moral hazard,
information asymmetries and entrenched misconceptions interfering with
efficient transactions. Managed care-based financing, however, was touted as
uniquely capable of fixing these problems, while improving quality and
reducing cost. The problem, health economist Henry Aaron suggests, is that
the cumulative effect of the market flaws was underappreciated.
Some health care analysts emphasize the pernicious effects of distorted prices.
Others dwell on irrationalities, poor information, and misaligned incentives.
The differences among health policy analysts on why health care markets
sometimes perform poorly run right through most disagreements on policy. Of
course, price signals might be distorted and people might behave with less than
perfect rationality and incentives of providers and patients might sometimes
diverge and flawed information might obstruct good decisions. It is striking,
however, that few disputants acknowledge that all of these problems might be
present at the same time.12

The central mechanism of managed care in practice, for all the high-flown
theoretical explication, was a classic black box. Managed care organizations
objected to too much probing into their contractual affairs, positing the
proprietary nature of the information and other harrumphing businesslike

10. Id. at 374 (citation omitted).
11. See THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG: CLINTON’S HEALTH SECURITY EFFORT AND THE
TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN U.S. POLITICS 133-72 (1996).
12. Henry J. Aaron, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Managed Competition, 27 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 31, 32 (2002).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

400

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:397

assertions. We were satisfied to leave it at that. We asked managed care to
work private sector magic on problems that had bedeviled government. As
with sausage making and the passage of laws, we were too often happy not to
be exposed to the precise mechanisms by which managed care controlled
utilization of health care. Sponsors seemed to ask that managed care provide
high quality care to more people for less money—never mind the details. As
James Robinson observed, “[t]he fundamental flaw of managed care, in
retrospect, was that it sought to navigate the tensions between limited
resources and unlimited expectations without explaining exactly how it was so
doing.”13 Yet, can it be blamed for its reticence? It was not often asked.
In hindsight, the hope that the largely for-profit managed care industry
would behave as an engine of good was also wishful thinking. We did not
simply buy into a black box solution to a complex problem. We also
committed the complex social tasks of controlling health costs and increasing
access to coverage to entities whose corporate charters charged managers with
the duty of running the enterprise so as to maximize returns to shareholders.
Society rejected the messiness of government and was smitten with the allure
of private enterprise. However, we have no business complaining when we
turn public business over to profit-oriented businesses only to find that they act
like profit-oriented businesses instead of public trusts.
Whether managed care was murdered (almost), committed suicide
(almost), or simply misunderstood the deal society struck, its day in the sun is
over. Managed care organizations will, undoubtedly, survive as going
concerns, but the curtain has dropped on their scene as saviors of health
finance. What is next? I will first describe three strands of evolution that seem
ready to flow from the diminished power center that is managed care. All
three seem plausible, although some are more certain than others. Time will
tell whether these strands will coexist, merge, further splinter or die out.
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to consider the outcome in the near and medium
term if the relationship among markets, managed care and government
continues along its current path. I will finish with some considerations that
might animate a public policy response to this evolution.
Evolution
Three trends are emerging with various degrees of strength as managed
care systems evolve. First, managed care organizations are loosening control
over patients’ choices of health care providers and services, blurring the
distinctions among health insurers and reducing their exposure to legal,
legislative and social criticism. Second, health insurance offerings are
stratifying into tiers in two ways. Employers, who until recently had been
paring down the number of plans offered to employees, are now sometimes
13. James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622, 2623 (2001).
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offering a menu of plans, from more expensive (but less restrictive) to less
expensive (but more restrictive). In addition, plan sponsors are expanding the
use of differentiation among participating providers by charging lower member
co-payments for services rendered at less expensive (or otherwise preferred)
providers. Third, some employers are expressing interest in emerging “patientdirected” plans, in which employees are given control over a health spending
account from which they are free (or freer) to choose their services and
providers. In addition, the employee is provided insurance coverage that
becomes available after a sizable deductible is met.
1.

Gray boxes

Managed care organizations have always been a heterogeneous bunch, and,
therefore, generalizations are to be taken with a grain of salt. Central to the
concept of managed care, however, is control: control of utilization to combat
moral hazard, control of provider panels to reduce cost and control over
medical practice to promote quality. Perhaps out of proprietary concern and
perhaps to avoid criticism, managed care organizations tended not to broadcast
the means by which this power was wielded—a reticence, even secrecy,
leading to the black box phenomenon mentioned above. In addition, practice
never quite matched theory as managed care organizations have been criticized
for failing to direct their organizational energy toward managing care, thereby
fulfilling managed competition’s vision of higher quality, more efficient health
care, and, instead, managing cost for short-term benefit.14
The black box is becoming less opaque as managed care plans loosen their
control over health coverage decisions. The model of managed care is shifting
from a tightly-controlled to a loosely-controlled system with less plan direction
as to choices of provider and frequency, and source and type of treatment.15 In
addition, the lines between different types of managed care organizations have
blurred, as plan sponsors “mix and match” features such as deductible, co-

14. See Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for the Quality of
Medical Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 10-14 (2000).
15. See Suzanne Felt-Lisk & Glen P. Mays, Back to the Drawing Board: New Directions in
Health Plans’ Care Management Strategies, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 210, 210-11;
Gabel et al., supra note 5, at 147-48; Jon Gabel, Ten Ways HMOs Have Changed During the
1990s, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1997, at 134, 136. Even Medicare is trying to broaden the types
of managed care plans it sponsors. Medicare+Choice was Congress’ 1997 effort to broaden the
types of managed care organization available to Medicare participants. The effort appears to have
been stillborn. Recently, the Department of Health and Human Services has announced a
“demonstration program” to attempt to encourage skittish firms to offer Preferred Provider
Organization membership to Medicaid beneficiaries. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Services, HHS Expands Health Plan Options in Medicare+Choice: New Demonstration
Program to Feature PPO Option in 23 States (Aug. 27, 2002), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2002pres/20020827.html.
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insurance and co-payment.16 This increased openness is driven by several of
the suspects detailed by Professor Jacobson: consumers, employers and
government.17 As two health researchers have recently reported:
Most recently health plans—particularly HMOs—have faced pressure to
change their care management strategies and redefine themselves on several
fronts. Consumers have voiced concerns about undue restrictions on choice
and unnecessary administrative hassles in seeking care and have begun
migrating to less restrictive health insurance products. . . . Meanwhile,
providers have complained about interference with medical decision making
and about burdensome administrative costs of complying with plans’ care
management policies; they have begun to resist these policies or withdraw
from plans that use them. In many states policymakers have responded to the
backlash by exploring regulatory restrictions on plans’ care management
policies.18

This evolutionary trend suggests a retreat from vigorous pursuit of some of the
central features of managed care—the features that had originally
differentiated managed care from other forms of health insurance. The range
of management plans still varies, of course, but the movement is toward less
control by plans and more freedom for members and physicians.
The proper characterization of this evolution is open to debate. To borrow
from Professor Jacobson, it may be explained as the natural result of the
battering of managed care plans by a variety of social actors and of the plans’
own failure to live up to advance billing. It may also be seen as a convenient
business move by firms that gained market share by offering something new,
and that now, having consolidated and absorbed the old guard, settle into the
more comfortable—although rather gray—business of merely acting as fiscal
intermediaries, that is, traditional insurance companies.
2.

Tiers

The second evolutionary trend in managed care is the creation of tiers of
coverage—the horizontal and vertical segmentation of services through
financial incentives. This trend follows from the first trend (the loosening of
controls) and from the observation that cost-control remains an imperative.
Supply-side managed care methods have called down society’s wrath;19 the
robust movement toward differential financial incentives to contain costs
suggests a move to demand-side cost containment methods. As James
Robinson explained:
16. See James C. Robinson, Web Exclusive, Renewed Emphasis on Consumer Cost Sharing
in Health Insurance Benefit Design, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 20, 2002, at W139, W140, at
http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/2103Robinson.pdf.
17. See Jacobson, supra note 7, at 367-68, 373, 376, 381.
18. Felt-Lisk & Mays, supra note 15, at 210 (footnotes omitted).
19. See Jacobson, supra note 7, at 375.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

AFTER MANAGED CARE

403

[T]he financial turmoil among integrated delivery systems and the regulatory
backlash against managed care have radically changed the industry’s strategy
and vision. Rather than seeking to control costs by limiting consumers’ choice
of providers, procedures, and products, health plans increasingly interpret their
role as one of packaging health care services, pricing them at actuarially
sustainable rates, gathering and disseminating information, promoting
electronic connectivity among all participants, and otherwise getting out from
between the consumer and the services the consumer wants to consume.20

The use of tiers of services can be separated into two types: horizontal
segmentation, in which consumers are induced to choose the richness of
coverage based on variable employee cost share, and vertical segmentation, in
which consumers within plans are induced to choose providers based on
variable employee cost share.
The novelty of these forms of segmentation should not be overstated. In
the first form, managed care organizations (or sponsors or self-insured
employers) “simply” offer incentives to encourage employees to focus on the
incremental value of the aspects of benefit design, thereby permitting them to
meter their costs to their preferred level of coverage, thereby maximizing their
utilities. This trend might be seen as suggesting a reversal of the recent trend
by which employers reduced the coverage choices available to employees, a
reduction undertaken to increase the employer’s leverage on plan premiums.
Yet, as Robinson indicates, this trend also suggests plans turning away from
direct attempts to shape provider behavior.21
In the second segmentation trend, managed care organizations (or sponsors
or self-insured employers) “simply” expand differentiated cost sharing that has
been used to provide incentives to use in-network providers. Plans are offering
a menu of cost sharing to members, calibrating the member’s share of the cost
to the provider’s charges (and sometimes other factors). Plan members may be
charged different cost sharing for in-plan providers depending on the price the
provider reports to the plan. This differential pricing method is now in use for
hospital, physician and pharmaceutical coverage.22 As the rate of differential
and the number of tiers increases, co-payments and co-insurance seem less a
gentle nudge to conform to the plan’s network design than a mechanism to
pass through discounts arranged between the plan and providers.
Like the trend toward loosening restrictions on medical practice, this trend
represents a retreat from core principles of managed care. Plans used the threat
of network exclusion as a means to strike hard bargains with providers, and
used control of network providers as a means to govern protocol and data
methods. In more recent years, the tables turned somewhat as powerful

20. Robinson, supra note 16, at W145.
21. Id.
22. Id. at W147.
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providers such as hospital systems and key medical groups used the threat of
withdrawal from the network as a means of increasing reimbursement. The
trend toward tier pricing signals a withdrawal of managed care plans from the
battlefield. A broad range of providers will be in the network, but not as
equals; they will face an internal market as plan members face different out-ofpocket costs according to the tier the provider occupies.23 The effect of this
trend is to stratify providers and members as well. Wealthy members will be
able to use their greater disposable incomes to see their providers of choice.24
Those of lesser means will increasingly face substantial co-payments and
coinsurance that will bar them from some providers. The size of the network
will be a boon to the wealthy for whom expanded co-payments are acceptable,
but an illusion to others; for the less wealthy, providers in the higher tiers may
as well be out-of-network providers.
3.

Consumerism

The third trend in managed care is the most controversial and least
developed trend. Consumer-directed health plans can be seen alternatively as a
recycling of the mid-1990s medical savings account idea, the product of
aggressive entrepreneurs, or as a poorly formed attempt to segment health
spending between costs properly the subject of insurance and properly
expensed as annual primary and preventive health costs. The motives for the
creation of consumer-directed plans track those discussed by Professor
Jacobson for the attacks on managed care: providers’ interest in lessening the
power of intermediaries between themselves and patients, consumers’ desire
for greater choice and employers’ twin desires to be responsive to employee
wishes and to insulate themselves from coming cost increases.25
Consumer-driven plans combine high-deductible insurance coverage–often
in the form of a preferred provider organization (“PPO”)—with a personal
spending account controlled by the consumer. The sponsor (usually the
employer) purchases the high-deductible coverage and also contributes a sum
(for example, $2,000) into an employee spending account. The employee
chooses when and with whom to spend the funds from the spending account,
although the sponsor may impose some limits (for example, permitting
23. See id. at W145; Myrle Croasdale, Plans Setting Higher Specialist Co-Pays, AM. MED.
NEWS, Apr. 1, 2002, at 1.
24. “Luxury primary care” is another emerging service highlighting the stratification of
access between haves and have-nots. Enrollees in luxury primary care pay an annual fee to a
medical practice and in return receive “old fashioned” care—extended primary care consultations,
comprehensive physicals with high-tech diagnostic testing and a range of amenities foreign to
most modern volume-driven practices. See Troyen A. Brennan, Luxury Primary Care–Market
Innovation or Threat to Access?, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1165 (2002).
25. See John V. Jacobi & Nicole Huberfeld, Quality Control, Enterprise Liability, and
Disintermediation in Managed Care, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 305, 311 (2001).
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spending on chiropractic, but not psychic consultations). If medical expenses
exceed the funds in the account, the employee is then subject to a deductible
(for example, $1,500) that must be met before becoming eligible for the plan’s
residual insurance coverage. Once the employee has spent the money in the
account and has met the yearly deductible amount, the high-deductible
insurance provides coverage with typical terms and conditions of payment.
The funds in an employee account are usually permitted to roll over from year
to year if not exhausted. Expenses incurred toward the deductible amount reset
each year.26
Although the coverage numbers are somewhat hard to pin down, it appears
that fewer than 100,000 Americans are actually members of consumer-driven
plans in 2002.27 Many people are skeptical of the long-term prospects of such
plans,28 but there have been reports of growing interest among large
employers.29 A recent analysis of these plans’ business prospects reported that
consumer-driven plans
have been successful in creating concept awareness on the part of employers
and, according to a Price Waterhouse survey, more than 50 percent of
employers plan to shift some to some kind of [consumer-driven plan] over the
next ten years. Other surveys by benefit consultants have been less
sanguine . . . . [I]n the first six months of 2001 . . . [consumer-driven plans]
announced contracts with several major employers . . . .30

The plans are new and their performance has not been tested.31

26. See Robinson, supra note 16, at W146-47; Jon B. Christianson et al., DefinedContribution Health Insurance Products: Development and Prospects, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb.
2002, at 49, 53-56; Jacobi & Huberfeld, supra note 25, at 310-12. See also Bill Brubaker, CoPay, or You Pay?; Firms Hope Worker-Directed Health Plans Will Curb Rising Costs, WASH.
POST, July 28, 2002, at H1; Laura Cohn, Giving Power to the Patient, BUS. WK., May 6, 2002, at
102; Barbara Martinez, Health Plan That Puts Employees in Charge of Spending Catches On,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2002, at B1.
27. See Brubaker, supra note 26, at H1.
28. See Gabel et al., supra note 5, at 150 (“[sixty-four] percent of employers say that these
plans would be unattractive to workers . . . .”).
29. See Brubaker, supra note 26, at H1 (“Only a handful of large U.S. employers are
offering consumer-directed plans this year. But dozens more, including Toys R Us Inc., Levi
Strauss & Co. and Allfirst Financial Inc. in Baltimore, will add consumer-directed plans to their
employee benefit menus in 2003, more than doubling the number of U.S. workers . . . who are
covered this year.”). See also Julie Appleby, New Insurance Plans Turn Patients into Shoppers,
USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 2002, at B1 (“While the total number of enrollees remains low, probably
fewer than 350,000, more employers are signing on, including Medtronic, Novartis, Ciba Vision,
Raytheon, the Budget Group and the University of Minnesota. A survey by benefits firm William
M. Mercer found that 19% of all employers—and 29% of those with more than 20,000 workers—
said they were likely to offer such insurance.”).
30. Christianson et al., supra note 26, at 58 (footnotes omitted).
31. Id. at 59.
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Recent advice from the Internal Revenue Service improved their prospects.
The IRS assured favorable tax treatment of the employee spending accounts
central to consumer-directed plans, ruling that the funds placed in the accounts
may be permitted to roll over from year to year, and that the funds will not be
counted as taxable income to the employee provided they are not associated
with a reduction in the employee’s salary and are used only for medical care
expenses.32 Entrepreneurs marketing this coverage have expressed hope that
the IRS ruling will give comfort to firms considering consumer-driven plans
that had been deterred by the fear of the tax consequences.33
The trend toward consumer-driven care is weaker than the first two trends
at this point, although there are some indications that it is gaining strength.
Like the first two trends, it also demonstrates a retreat from managed care
principles–dramatically for primary and routine care, and less so for acute care.
The promise of most consumer-driven plans is that consumers themselves can
act as prudent purchasers if given the chance, obviating the need for managed
care plans to act as expert intermediaries between consumers and providers, at
least until the spending account and deductible are exhausted. These plans
may be more attractive for the wealthy than the poor, because the wealthy have
the means to spend through their accounts and deductibles to reach their
residual insurance. Those of lesser means may spend reluctantly, attempting to
husband their spending accounts against the advent of an emergency, thereby
foregoing medically appropriate care.34 In addition, there is substantial reason
to suspect the ability of lay people to judge (even with the assistance of the
web-based resources) the quality of caregivers. Consumer-driven plans have
migrated far from the vision of managed care as an expert organizer of medical
care. They are instead a reaction to the failings of managed care, and they hold
little promise of advancing social goals of cost control, increased access to
coverage and improvements in quality.
Public Policy Concerns
The loosening of control by managed care organizations does not suggest a
return to physician-controlled expenditures. Plan sponsors, and therefore
plans, will remain attentive to the need to combat moral hazard and to control

32. Rev. Rul. 2002-41, 2002-28 I.R.B. 75, 76; IRS Notice 2002-45, 2002-28 I.R.B. 93, 93,
95.
33. Press Release, Lumenos, Internal Revenue Service Rules Favorably on Consumers’
Health Savings, at http://www.lumenos.com/press/IRSRuling (June 26, 2002).
34. See Jason S. Lee & Laura Tollen, Web Exclusive, How Low Can You Go? The Impact of
Reduced Benefits and Increased Cost Sharing, HEALTH AFF., June 19, 2002, at W229, W237, at
http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/2104Lee.pdf (“[P]atients who are ill informed but
empowered with choice may purchase less or lower-quality care and may pay more for it.”).
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cost.35 The three trends described above are not exclusive, but they forecast a
health finance system moving away from the managed competition vision of
cohesive packages of coverage, with a sharp eye toward cost and quality.
Instead, and in reaction to the failing of the managed care visions, health
finance is drifting toward moderate decentralization with a dose of lay
decision-making superimposed on a skeleton of managed care. This is not a
pretty public policy picture.
The decentralization and increase in choice evident in the evolution of
managed care carry with them the concomitant of segmentation of the covered
population. To afford insureds more choice, plan sponsors are slicing and
dicing plans by richness of coverage, depth of out-of-pocket payment and
expansiveness of provider participation.
This segmentation inevitably
separates the fates of people in society on various bases, including wealth, age,
employment status and geography. This fragmentation of insurance pools is
contrary to what is most salutary about health insurance – its fundamental
communal purpose. At its heart, health insurance joins us together, creating a
mechanism by which we can each contribute to a fund reserved for the needs
of those who come to need expensive medical care.36 Deborah Stone captured
this concept elegantly in a recent essay:
Insurance is a social institution that particularly invites moral contemplation
about questions of suffering, compassion, and responsibility. In so doing, it
enlarges the public conception of social responsibility. Insurance serves as an
arena for this kind of reflection and deliberation because it is kept in the public
consciousness by the private marketing activities of commercial insurers, the
bargaining activities of unions and workplaces, and the public debates over
social insurance. The basic premise of insurance is collective responsibility for
harms that befall individuals, because insurance pools people’s savings to pay
for individuals’ future losses. Thus, whenever insurance is discussed,
questions of allocating responsibility between individuals and society are
barely beneath the surface.37

As plan design tailors itself to the perceived insurance wishes of individuals, it
seeks to advance the goals of choice and autonomy. However, it also does

35. See Ezekiel Emanuel, Health Care Reform: Still Possible, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 32, 33 (“Leaving health care decisions to each doctor’s discretion has been
undermined by quality and cost data. When everyone is talking about the importance of systems
for delivering safe, high quality, and cost effective care, it is hard to imagine that we will
dismantle the very delivery system capable of doing this. It is much more likely that a new form
of managed care will arise.”).
36. See John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 315-18
(1997).
37. Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance As Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN.
INS. L.J. 11, 16 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
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something more fundamental. It impairs the discussion of social responsibility
and weakens the connections among members of the community.
The trends in managed care have very concrete effects as well. First, the
emphasis on consumer direction imposes on consumers the responsibility
(which some may think they want) of choosing when and from whom to obtain
treatment. Cost-conscious consumers are notoriously poor at differentiating
between unneeded and therefore dispensable treatments and those necessary to
preserve life and health. Cost-conscious consumers may reject some
treatment, but there is no reason to believe consumers will choose well which
treatment to reject. Second, increased consumer cost-sharing regressively
finances expanded choice that may be an extravagance that the poor and near
poor would prefer to avoid. “Forcing the poor to purchase comprehensive
insurance while forgoing goods and services to which they attach higher value
is not doing them any favor.”38
Third, increased consumer cost-sharing will lead to reduced levels of
insurance for the working poor, a population already heavily over-represented
in ranks of the uninsured. Employers in a slowing economy will likely
increase employees’ share of insurance cost as a wage-conserving strategy.39
However, past increases in employee cost-sharing have dramatically reduced
the rate of “take-up” of insurance by low-income wage earners, as they simply
decline the offer of insurance because they need the income for more
immediate family expenses.40
Finally, the fragmentation of the health insurance system and the
withdrawal of plan managers from evaluative positions impairs the ability of
plans to serve as engines of quality improvement. It is now widely understood
that medical error results in a large number of avoidable injuries,41 and that
preventing these errors is not a matter of eliminating “bad apples,” but rather
of improving systems of care to avoid the occasion of injury.42 The
decentralization of managed care impairs the movement toward systemic
improvement of health care because a diffusion of responsibility and
governance weakens control over the provision of services.43

38. Robinson, supra note 16, at W152.
39. Lee & Tollen, supra note 34, at W238.
40. See Richard Kronick & Todd Gilmer, Explaining the Decline in Health Insurance
Coverage, 1979-1995, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 30, 36-37; Philip F. Cooper & Barbara
Steinberg Schone, More Offers, Fewer Takers for Employment-Based Health Insurance: 1987
and 1996, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 142, 146.
41. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 6, at 1.
42. See id. at 4; 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS’ STUDY: ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY, APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
124 (1991).
43. See Jacobi & Huberfeld, supra note 25, at 314.
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Managed care is a wounded vehicle for achieving society’s health finance
goals—whether due to its own mismanagement, the attacks of others or a
fundamental misunderstanding in the social compact that lead to its emergence
as a dominant public policy tool. It will remain a dominant player, but will
also evolve—probably in the direction of decentralization and increased
consumer responsibility—if health finance continues to drift as it does now.
For the reasons James Robinson, Henry Aaron and others have offered, recent
history has demonstrated that managed care plans, even as modified in reaction
to backlash, are not well suited to serve the goals of increasing access,
containing cost and assuring quality, absent a non-market public policy
Several general points of guidance emerge from an
intervention.44
examination of this recent history.
First, there is no going back to the unmanaged care that managed care
replaced. The cost pressures generated by technological advances and an
aging population are real, and leaving treatment decisions entirely to individual
patients and physicians will not do.45 Second, and following from the first
point, cost pressures will produce scarcity, and choices must be made—not
only to reject medically unnecessary care, but also to evaluate and select
among medically useful treatments.46 Third, the maldistribution of resources
among social classes and the technical sophistication required for rationing
choices suggest that rationing through individual purchasing decisions by
consumers will not achieve equitable results, and that some management of
care decisions will be necessary. Fourth, the strong preference of consumers
for choice must be accommodated.
Where, then, does managed care fit in? Whatever the source of funding for
health care, managed care plans can serve as tools for organizing care. The
failure of the black box method of rationing, however, suggests that the
process by which rationing occurs can no longer be committed to a deeply
flawed market. Perhaps a cue can be taken from consumer-driven plans in at
least one regard, that the tolerance of consumers for central management and
demand for autonomy may differ depending on the type of health care service.
Consumers can search for information or gain direct experience with respect to
some health care services (for example, the skills of a physical therapist, the
personality of a primary care physician or the quality of orthodontic

44. In addition, and although it is beyond the scope of this brief comment, Russell Korobkin
has persuasively described the “bounded rationality” of health care consumers, and therefore the
limitations on the extent to which providing additional information or other correctives to health
care market failures could correct for the inefficiencies identified by Aaron. See Russell
Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts,
Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 48-62 (1999).
45. See Emanuel, supra note 35, at 33.
46. See id.
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services).47 Other services, including most acute care services, are simply
beyond the layperson’s ability to evaluate.48 Consumer-driven plans loosely
match their financing methods to this market reality—primary and preventive
care can be thought of as within the ambit of consumer-directed spending
accounts, and the acute care is within the ambit of managed insurance
coverage.
Chronic care is more problematic. Care for chronic illness includes
aspects of primary and acute care, and accounts for a large and growing
percentage of health expenditures. Managed care plans seem ideally suited to
the coordination of care for the chronically ill. Plans could guide a chronically
ill member to the most appropriate level of care, create and facilitate a
comprehensive care plan, and ensure communication among the broad range of
providers responsible for the member’s direct care. Unfortunately, managed
care plans have promised more than they have delivered here, although some
plan sponsors finally seem interested in developing their potential.
The managed care backlash does not negate the need to restrain spending;
indeed, it seems inevitable that restrictions in care will be more necessary in
the future. However, the backlash suggests that black box management has
failed and that some combination of public and consumer management of the
distribution of health care resources must come to the fore. Most significantly,
rationing decisions will not be committed as easily to commercial firms
operating in a deeply flawed market, but must be made in a public process of
some sort.49 Managed care’s role within a new system could be borrowed
from consumer-directed plans, and the financing or management or both of
care could be literally or virtually segmented to treat the separate rationing
concerns associated with acute, primary and chronic care. This segmentation
may paradoxically assist in melding the public governance and individual
choice imperatives, employing a model of organizational structure emerging
from managed care plans.

47. Korobkin, supra note 44, at 27-28 (describing “search,” “experience,” and “credence”
goods).
48. Id. at 28.
49. On a different aspect of managed care regulation, Korobkin makes the case that an
expert governmental commission might possess the correct blend of independence and
accountability to handle such a delicate task. Id. at 83-85.

